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The flourishing cooperation in German-Chinese relations is transforming into rocky friendship 
due to the increasingly strong economic rivalry between the two nations. Recent acquisitions 
of German companies by Chinese investors indicate that Germany is struggling to defend its 
interests in bilateral relations with Beijing in an assertive manner. Berlin is becoming increas-
ingly aware of the need to devise and pursue a common EU policy towards China. It cannot be 
ruled out that the rising power of the Middle Kingdom will be a key argument when devising 
new initiatives within the EU’s industrial policy for defending Europe against an influx of in-
vestors from outside the EU. So far, Germany has been the main brake on progress, blocking 
the adoption of such solutions. In this context, there may be a chance for American-European 
cooperation, should the new US President Donald Trump be interested in pursuing a more 
assertive policy towards China.
Until recently, it seemed that German- 
-Chinese relations will continue to develop 
dynamically. Over the last five years, meetin-
gs of high-ranking politicians were held eve-
ry couple of weeks, the talks were conduc-
ted in a friendly atmosphere and the value 
of the contracts signed set new records. This 
mood of mutual German-Chinese fascination 
was disturbed in spring 2016, when the Kuka 
company, Germany’s leading producer of in-
dustrial robots, was acquired by a Chinese 
investor against the will of the German go-
vernment. Bilateral relations cooled down, 
mutual accusations of unfair intentions were 
formulated and attempts were made by po-
litical methods to limit the development of 
economic cooperation. The wave of distrust 
culminated in decisions by Sigmar Gabriel, 
Vice Chancellor of Germany and Minister for 
Economic Affairs, to launch a procedure for 
in-depth verification of applications submit-
ted by Chinese investors regarding the pos-
sible acquisition of two other German com-
panies: Aixtron and Ledvance. Until recently, 
it seemed that obtaining consent for such 
acquisition was a mere formality. Numerous 
contentious issues are a sign of increasingly 
evident limitations upon the further deve-
lopment of German-Chinese relations. Ger-
many has become aware that the growing 
number of economic ties with China may 
bring in tandem with the many benefits also 
certain threats.
The Chinese market as salvation 
for German exporters
The deterioration of the economic situation in 
the Eurozone, which started in 2010, forced 
German producers to seek other markets 
to compensate for the consequences of the 
stagnation in the Eurozone. For German ex-
porters, who maintained large production 
capacities, intensified cooperation with the 
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emerging economies came as an attractive 
alternative. The development of economic re-
lations between Germany and China proved 
to be particularly successful due to a num-
ber of factors. Firstly, despite the global eco-
nomic deterioration the Chinese economy 
continued to grow at a rapid pace. According 
to the OECD, the average GDP growth rate 
recorded for old-EU states in 2009–2015 was 
0.3%, whereas the figure for China was 8.4%. 
Secondly, when the global economic crisis be-
gan the government in Beijing did not report 
a particularly high debt level, which is why it 
could afford to launch large industry-specific 
stimulus packages in subsequent years. A sig-
nificant portion of these funds was earmarked 
for the economic modernisation programme, 
what made it attractive for German compa-
nies – the leading producers of machines, 
energy generation technologies and chemical 
products. Similarly, Germany took advantage 
of the increase in the average income earned 
by members of the Chinese middle class, who 
began to buy German cars in large numbers. 
Thirdly, even before the global financial crisis 
German-Chinese economic relations were de-
veloping dynamically, albeit asymmetrically. 
For Germany, China was the third biggest im-
port market and only the ninth biggest export 
market. This asymmetry disturbed the trade 
balance – in 2008 Germany recorded a trade 
deficit with China to the tune of 15 billion 
euro. Last but not least, the German govern-
ment secured the development of economic 
cooperation with China by avoiding political 
tensions. In 2010, China was the first emerg-
ing economy to be included in the group 
of states with which Germany held regular 
meetings under inter-governmental consul-
tations. Issues which the government in Bei-
jing considered sensitive, such as the human 
rights dialogue, were marginalised on the 
political agenda and replaced with a debate 
on the rule of law1. This was an evident shift 
in the policy adopted by Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, who in previous years decided not to 
attend the opening ceremony of the Summer 
Olympics in Beijing in a gesture of solidarity 
with Tibetan people and in 2007 met with the 
Dalai Lama. Germany used to play the role of 
China’s advocate in Beijing’s relations with 
the EU, for example in the dispute over Chi-
na subsidising its exports from public funds. 
Berlin called on its EU partners to avoid the 
situation in which such tension could reduce 
the pace of development of economic coop-
eration. As far as problematic issues in Ger-
man-Chinese relations are concerned, such as 
the Chinese government limiting the exports 
of rare earth minerals2, Germany has left the 
task of resolving them to Brussels. 
The combination of these factors contribut-
ed to a rapid increase in trade exchange be-
tween Germany and China. In 2008–2014, 
the value of goods exported by German com-
panies to the Chinese market soared by 118% 
to 74 billion euro, and the value of German 
imports from China increased by 34% to 80 
billion euro. For comparison, over that same 
period Germany’s total exports increased by 
14% and its imports by 13%. In 2014, China 
rose by several places in the ranking and be-
came Germany’s fourth biggest export mar-
ket and its second biggest import market. 
1 This phrasing was convenient for both sides: for China, 
because the Western-centric “human rights” was re-
placed with the neutral “state of law”, and for Germa-
ny, because the “state of law” provided for abandoning 
certain arbitrary decisions including towards Western 
companies operating in China. 
2 J. Erling, B. Fuest, China muss seine Rohstoffe mit der 
Welt teilen, Die Welt, 31 January 2012, https://www.
welt.de/wirtschaft/article13844429/China-muss-seine-
Rohstoffe-mit-der-Welt-teilen.html
The deterioration of the economic situ-
ation in the Eurozone, which started in 
2010, forced German producers to seek 
other non-European markets.
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Due to favourable trade results, the frequent 
objections of German companies (such as 
high levels of corruption in China, attempts of 
Chinese at taking over/stealing German tech-
nologies and limited access to many sectors 
of the Chinese economy) lose prominence. 
The first cracks in economic friendship
The trade results for 2015 triggered certain 
doubts as to whether it would be possible 
to achieve a more balanced trade exchange 
between Germany and China. In 2015, for 
the first time in many years, the volume 
of Germany’s exports to China fell by 4%. 
In that period, the import of goods from Chi-
na increased by 15%, causing a significant 
reincrease in Germany’s trade deficit – from 
5 billion euro to 20 billion euro, which re-
versed the previously observed downward 
trend. This was the first sign that trade re-
lations were not becoming more balanced 
and that the government in Beijing might, in 
a situation of economic slowdown, contin-
ue to apply instruments to subsidise China’s 
exports alongside mechanisms to protect its 
domestic market. 
The slower pace of economic cooperation was 
accompanied by personnel changes in bodies 
responsible for Germany’s economic policy. 
After the SPD joined the ruling coalition in 
2013, for the first time since 2005, the Minis-
try for Economic Affairs was to be supervised 
by a SPD politician instead of a FDP one. The 
new minister was Vice Chancellor Sigmar Ga-
briel, who was particularly sensitive to voices 
from German trade unions. This fact seemed 
to be unimportant until 2016, when a dis-
pute between Brussels and Beijing emerged 
involving steel products. In 2001, upon join-
ing the World Trade Organisation, Beijing 
had to accept the condition that in justified 
cases the EU may impose anti-dumping tar-
iffs on goods manufactured in China. Some 
of these procedures were intended to lapse 
after 15 years3. The Chinese government in-
terpreted this provision in its own interest 
and demanded that China be granted market 
economy status in 2016, which would involve 
a significant limitation of EU anti-dumping 
tariffs imposed on Chinese-made goods. 
The expectation was that Germany would 
consent to achieving some kind of compro-
mise with Beijing regarding China’s market 
economy status, fearing (in a situation of 
a trade war between Brussels and Beijing) po-
tential losses of German companies operat-
ing in the Chinese market. 
To Germany, the crisis on the steel produc-
tion market came as a barrier to an amicable 
resolution of the dispute over China’s mar-
ket economy status. In early 2016, European 
steel manufacturers began to complain about 
Chinese steel being sold at dumping prices, 
flooding the EU market. This was a result 
of massive overproduction of steel in China. 
After the economic slowdown, the Chinese 
economy significantly reduced its demand for 
steel. The problem of massive inflow of Chi-
nese steel onto the European market did not 
spare German companies – at the beginning 
of 2016 thousands of workers organised pro-
tests in German steelworks. One of the main 
demands voiced during these protests in-
volved limiting the import of steel from China. 
3 J. Jakóbowski, M. Kaczmarski, ‘The EU on granting Chi-
na market economy status: a compromise or a dodge?’, 
OSW Commentary, 5 August 2016, https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2016-08-05/eu-
granting-china-market-economy-status-a-compromise-
or-a-dodge
Over time, Germany became increasingly 
concerned with the fact that after several 
years of insignificant growth in the vol-
ume of Chinese investments in Germany, 
in subsequent years the value of these 
investments soared.
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In February 2016, Sigmar Gabriel, Minister for 
Economic Affairs, co-signed a letter written 
by six ministers of the economy (from Italy, 
the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Belgium 
and Luxembourg) addressed to the Europe-
an Commission and containing a demand to 
counteract the flooding of the European mar-
ket by subsidised steel from China and Rus-
sia4. Brussels reacted within a couple of days 
and imposed anti-dumping tariffs on produc-
ers from these countries5. Despite this, the 
issue was not entirely resolved and Germa-
ny began to see the threats connected with 
granting China market economy status.
Selling off the family silver 
for next to nothing?
German-Chinese tension became even more 
evident in the field of investments. In recent 
years, a conviction was widespread in Germa-
ny that Chinese companies will purchase mi-
nor German companies riddled with financial 
problems. It was expected that they would 
not be interested in acquiring companies 
which dispose of cutting edge technologies 
and recognizable brands. Numerous previous 
acquisitions were examples of this rule – the 
biggest acquisitions carried out before 2016 
included the purchase in 2011 of the electron-
ics producer Medion for 530 million euro and 
the purchase in 2012 of Putzmeister, a man-
ufacturer of devices used in the construction 
sector, for 360 million euro. Chinese investors 
were viewed as an opportunity to provide 
a new development impetus and to foster 
greater openness of the Chinese market to 
German companies struggling with structural 
problems and insufficient capital. Moreover, 
Germany was aware that considerably more 
capital was flowing from Germany to China 
4 Gabriel fordert Schutz vor chinesischen Billigimporten, 
Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/unterne-
hmen/sigmar-gabriel-fordert-schutz-der-stahlindus-
trie-vor-china-a-1076213.html
5 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content /DE/TXT/PD-
F/?uri=CELEX:32016R1328&from=EN
than vice versa. This was due to the fact that 
in an attempt to increase their profits in the 
Chinese market, German companies locat-
ed their entire production facilities in China. 
According to calculations by the Bundesbank, 
in 2013 alone German companies invested 
8 billion euro in China, whereas the invest-
ments carried out by China in Germany 
amounted to 0.6 billion euro. 
Over time, Germany became increasingly 
concerned with the fact that after several 
years of insignificant growth in the volume 
of Chinese investments in Germany, in sub-
sequent years the value of these investments 
soared. The fact that in 2014 the value of 
Chinese investments in Germany increased to 
1 billion euro and in 2015 to nearly 2 billion 
euro was particularly astonishing, especially 
given that these figures did not reflect the 
full scale of the changes, as Chinese investors 
frequently made their purchases via daughter 
companies registered for example in Luxem-
bourg. According to calculations by the con-
sulting firm EY, in the first three quarters of 
2016 alone the value of Chinese investments 
in Germany reached 11.4 billion euro, which 
is more than the total investments carried out 
by Chinese companies in Germany in 2006– 
–20156. Even greater distrust, especially with-
in Germany’s political elites, was triggered 
by the fact that investors from China started 
making attempts at acquiring stakes in com-
panies ranked high among Germany’s lead-
ing technology companies. In 2014, Chinese 
6 Misstöne in den deutsch-chinesischen Handelsbeziehun-
gen, Deutsche Mittelstands Nachrichten, http://www.
deutsche-mittelstands-nachrichten.de/2016/10/86090/
German politicians have recognized 
a model of takeovers: Chinese investors 
try to acquire technologies owned by 
German companies, taking advantage 
of these companies’ low market valuation.
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investors purchased a stake in Avic, a produc-
er of aeronautic equipment, for 467 million 
euro, and in 2016 – a stake in Krauss-Maffei, 
a manufacturer of plastic and rubber goods, 
for 925 million euro and EEW Energy, a com-
pany involved in designing renewable energy 
generation technologies, for 1.4 billion euro. 
German politicians have recognized a model 
of these transactions: Chinese investors try to 
acquire technologies owned by German com-
panies, taking advantage of these companies’ 
low market valuation.
The German public’s concerns returned in 
May 2016, when the Chinese investment fund 
Midea communicated its plan to acquire the 
Kuka company – one of Germany’s leading 
producers of robots. With full support from 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, Sigmar Gabriel, 
Vice Chancellor and Minister for Econom-
ic Affairs, almost instantaneously began to 
seek a solution to block the deal7. According 
to press reports, the Ministry for Economic 
Affairs tried to convince German companies 
and companies from other EU countries to 
submit a counter-bid for the purchase of 
Kuka. This solution was allegedly welcomed 
by the Federal Cartel Office8. However, Eu-
ropean electro-technical companies, such as 
Siemens and ABB, considered the Chinese bid, 
amounting to nearly 5 billion euro, too high 
to outbid it. The actions by the German Min-
istry for Economic Affairs received support 
from Günther Oettinger, the then German 
European Commissioner for Digital Economy 
and Society, who considered Kuka a strategic 
company of key importance for the EU’s dig-
ital future9. German politicians came to the 
conclusion that the takeover will be a blow 
7 K. Stratmann, Gabriels Zwangsbeglückung für Kuka, 
Handelsblatt, 2 June 2016, p. 10.
8 T. Sigmund, K. Stratmann, M. Wocher, Kuka: Jetzt greift 
die Politik ein, Handelsblatt, 1 June 2016, p. 1-5. 
9 Politik fürchtet Kuka-Verkauf nach China, Der Spiegel, 
30 May 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/
unternehmen /kuka-grossak t ionaer-bremst-vor-
stand-bei-midea-angebot-a-1094935.html
to Germany’s economic strategy of industri-
al development which involves the creation 
of a comprehensive and highly automated 
system connecting production plants directly 
with suppliers via state-of-the-art IT systems. 
Moreover, certain threats to economic secu-
rity were identified. There was rising concern 
that when the deal is struck the Chinese will 
get access to sensitive data of key German 
industrial companies which use Kuka robots 
in their production plants10. 
The atmosphere during inter-governmental 
consultations between China and Germany 
held in June 2016 was considerably cooler 
than before and clearly burdened with the dis-
pute over Kuka. No compromise was reached 
despite the fact that the Chinese partners 
had declared their will to limit the purchase 
of the company to a minority stake. during 
the consulations Chancellor Merkel was more 
assertive than before and demanded greater 
openness of new sectors of the Chinese mar-
ket to German companies. 
Finally, the takeover of Kuka could not be 
blocked due to strong resistance from busi-
ness circles. The president of Kuka’s supervi-
sory board strongly supported the bid sub-
mitted by the Chinese investor and rejected 
the intervention plan prepared by German 
politicians. Representatives of those German 
industry sectors which have a strong presence 
in the Chinese market, such as the automotive 
10 T. Sigmund, K. Stratmann, M. Wocher, Kuka: Jetzt greift 
die Politik ein, Handelsblatt, 1 June 2016, p. 1-5.
The acquisition of Kuka by a Chinese 
company has made the German govern-
ment aware that at present it does not 
have sufficient instruments to control 
the acquisitions by Chinese companies 
of their competitors in Germany.
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and the machine-building sectors, empha-
sised that so far there was no evidence that 
the acquisitions carried out by Chinese com-
panies could contribute to a deterioration of 
the German economy and foster re-location 
of production from Germany to China11.
The German concept of a shield against 
non-EU investments
The controversy surrounding the purchase 
of Kuka has made the German government 
aware that at present it does not have suffi-
cient instruments to control the acquisitions 
by Chinese companies of their competitors 
in Germany. For this reason the government 
took measures to amend the law in this re-
spect. At present, pursuant to the law on 
external economic relations, the German 
Ministry for Economic Affairs has at its dis-
posal regulations which enable it to block 
a purchase of a 25% or bigger stake in Ger-
man companies which are considered im-
portant from the point of view of the state’s 
security or critical infrastructure. Pursuant to 
this regulation it is authorised to withhold the 
acquisition by a non-EU investor of a compa-
ny producing cybersecurity software, but it 
cannot block any acquisition of a company 
producing advanced technology products for 
civilian application. The inherent limitations 
in these regulations have become evident in 
the current acquisition projects implement-
ed by Chinese companies and involving the 
purchase of Aixtron, a producer of electronic 
chips, and Ledvance, a daughter company of 
Osram producing lighting solutions. In Sep-
tember 2016, the Ministry for Economic Af-
fairs consented to the deal involving Aixtron, 
but a month later decided that it is necessary 
to reconsider the prospective acquisition. 
According to media reports, this was inspired 
by information obtained from US intelligence 
11 K. Stratman, Gabriels Zwangsbeglückung für Kuka, 
Handelsblatt, 2 June 2016, p. 10.
suggesting that the deal may pose a threat 
to states security12. As far as Ledvance is con-
cerned, the ministry used a loophole involving 
a detailed reconsideration of the proposed 
deal, even though it concerned the rather un-
controversial lighting sector. At the same time, 
this could have been a signal to the Chinese 
government to dampen the appetite of Chi-
nese companies for making acquisitions, as 
there was press speculation suggesting that 
they consider acquiring Osram, the leading 
German producer of electro-technical goods. 
The price for amending Germany’s policy has 
been the almost instantaneous deteriora-
tion in the atmosphere of political relations. 
Sigmar Gabriel’s visit to China in October 
2016 was given a decidedly cool reception 
– many of the planned meetings were can-
celled by the hosts at the last moment.
In the aftermath of the 2016 experiences 
with Chinese investors, the German Minis-
try for Economic Affairs adopted a new plan 
to introduce new regulations at EU level to 
obtain the possibility to control acquisitions 
and, at the same time, to shift the responsi-
bility for disputes in the relations with Beijing 
resulting from blocking specific transactions 
onto Brussels, freeing Berlin from this respon-
sibility. German media reported on the pro-
posed amendment to EU law, submitted by 
the Ministry for Economic Affairs, demanding 
increased protection of EU companies against 
12 US-Geheimdienste stoppen Verkauf deutscher Firma 
nach China, http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unterneh-
men/2016-10/aixtron-china-uebernahme-usa-intervention
Germany is becoming increasingly aware 
that due to their non-transparent ties 
with the government in Beijing, Chinese 
companies in effect have unlimited cap-
ital at their disposal which they can use 
to carry out acquisitions. 
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acquisitions by non-EU investors. According 
to this concept, EU institutions could block 
such a transaction should it be targeting EU 
companies which “dispose of key technology 
of particular importance for industrial devel-
opment”13. If this amendment is introduced, 
Brussels would obtain powers similar to those 
Washington has on the US market. 
Gabriel’s concept received only partial sup-
port from business circles and the ruling co-
alition. Some CDU/CSU politicians fear that 
the proposals put forward by the Ministry for 
Economic Affairs, headed by an SPD politi-
cian, are too far-reaching and could weaken 
market economy mechanisms in Germany. 
Similar objections have been voiced by a por-
tion of business circles who claim that Ger-
many, as an economy which to a considerable 
extent depends on the freedom of movement 
of capital and trade, should not be sending 
signals regarding the increased level of pro-
tectionism on its domestic market, as this 
could affect German investments in China14. 
German companies expect the federal gov-
ernment to step up its political pressure on 
Beijing to open up new sectors of the Chinese 
economy to German investments, rather than 
introduce new restrictions. 
The strategic rivalry – the limits of 
German-Chinese economic cooperation
Germany is becoming increasingly aware that 
due to non-transparent ties of the Chinese 
business with the government in Beijing and 
access to large amounts of foreign currency 
reserves, they have in practise unlimited capi-
tal at their disposal which they can use to car-
ry out acquisitions. In the medium term, the 
goal of these companies is to become lead-
13 J. Erling, Gabriel macht nun ernst – und China ist 
verärgert, Die Welt, https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/
article159068808/Gabriel-macht-nun-ernst-und-Chi-
na-ist-veraergert.html
14 H. Anger, M. Greive, D. Heide, Schutz oder Schaden?, 
Handelsblatt, 18 October 2016, p. 12.
ers in the sector of industrial goods, which 
would de facto be tantamount to ousting 
German companies from this position. For 
a long time, Germany ignored the aspect of 
rivalry in its relations with China but the im-
pressive technological advancement of Chi-
nese producers has forced German politicians 
to reconsider their former views.
Berlin is becoming increasingly convinced that 
one consequence of the dynamically develop-
ing cooperation is that China – Germany’s key 
economic rival – continues to strengthen its 
position15. German producers are aware that 
the level of Chinese companies’ technologi-
cal advancement is growing steadily and that 
these companies are becoming increasingly 
strong competitors to German companies 
on third country markets. German exporters 
increasingly frequently lose their shares on 
third country markets, such as India, Japan 
and the United States, to producers from 
China. This tendency has been evident also in 
Germany’s strongest industrial sectors such 
as the machine-building sector16.
The German market is particularly attractive 
to Chinese investors because it is dominat-
ed by small and medium-sized companies 
which frequently dispose of the best indus-
trial technologies and do not have a strong 
15 J. Wübbeke, B. Conrad, Industrie 4.0: will German 
Technology Help China Catch Up with the West, China 
Monitor, Mercator Institute for China Studies, no. 23, 
14 April 2015; http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/
templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_
No_23_en.pdf
16 H. Hauschild et al, China – Partner und Konkurrent: Eine 
Analyse der deutsch-chinesischen Handelsbeziehungen, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh 2015, p. 8.
Berlin is becoming increasingly con-
vinced that one consequence of the 
dynamically developing cooperation is 
that its key economic rival continues to 
strengthen its position.
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capital buffer (in Germany these compa-
nies are referred to as ‘hidden champions’). 
In the environment of a weakened euro and 
the overall weakness of the European market 
in the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, Chi-
nese investors may want to use the emerg-
ing opportunities and purchase stakes in 
companies coping with structural problems 
or lacking capital for further development. 
The arguments regarding the protection of 
German companies against takeovers meet 
with a favourable response from German 
society, which is becoming increasingly dis-
trustful of globalisation. It was no accident 
that the resistance among German society to 
the signing of the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Agreement with the United States 
was particularly strong, even though German 
companies were supposed to be the biggest 
beneficiaries of this agreement.
Much suggests that Beijing intends to step 
up its measures to limit the access of foreign 
companies to its domestic market. In recent 
months, the Chinese government made two 
spectacular decisions affecting German au-
tomotive companies. First, the Chinese lead-
ership demanded that all electric cars in the 
Chinese market be required to provide their 
operating data to relevant state institutions. 
German producers considered this an ex-
tremely controversial move because the main 
competitive advantage of their cars involves 
strict protection of the drivers’ personal de-
tails. Making these available to the Chinese 
government would undermine this  aspect of 
competitiveness. Moreover, German compa-
nies are afraid that the data may be used by 
their Chinese competitors17 as an important 
source of information regarding the tech-
nologies used by German producers. Anoth-
er significant threat to German automotive 
companies involves the introduction (planned
17 M. Fasse, S. Scheuer, China will Elektroautos überwa-
chen, Handelsbaltt, 13 October 2016, p. 18-19.
by the government in Beijing for 2018) of the 
requirement to guarantee a specific share of 
electric cars in the total production volume of 
automotive companies operating in China18. 
Should these companies fail to meet this 
requirement, they would be obliged to buy 
special certificates, which would equate to 
a fine. To German manufacturers this new 
regulation comes as a particular problem be-
cause until now they have mainly specialised 
in the production of internal combustion en-
gines. These examples indicate that the Chi-
nese market is quickly losing its status of an 
exceptionally profitable market for German 
companies and the government in Beijing is 
ready to take unconventional measures to 
control the expansion of foreign producers 
on the Chinese market.
Conclusions
1. German producers are aware that the ac-
tions by the government in Beijing and the 
increasingly tough competition from Chinese 
producers will likely limit their extraordinary 
profits in the Chinese market. German politi-
cians have become frustrated at China abus-
ing the German market’s openness and at the 
same time maintaining investment restric-
tions in the Chinese domestic market. Should 
further disputes between Brussels and Beijing 
emerge in the near future, this may convince 
German politicians to intensify their lobby-
ing activities in favour of TTIP, as long as the 
signing thereof will continue to be under ne-
gotiation with the United States. This agree-
ment could help the EU and the USA devise 
a common framework of cooperation with 
emerging economies, although until recently 
the prevalent view in Germany was that this 
could rather be achieved by way of develop-
ing the bilateral relations.
18 Quote für E-Autos China schreckt deutsche Au-
tokonzerne auf, Der Spiegel, http://www.spiegel.de/
wirtschaft/unternehmen/e-auto-quote-in-china-schock-
iert-deutsche-autokonzerne-a-1118966.html
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2. The German government is aware of the 
increasing risk involved in consenting to 
Chinese investments in Germany. These in-
vestments not only generate the risk that 
German technologies may be purchased by 
Chinese companies but also may weaken the 
operation of market mechanisms and lead to 
a complete takeover of specific German com-
panies by the Chinese state. This is due to the 
opaque ties between the state and Chinese 
private companies. Moreover, despite their 
declared intention to maintain production in 
local plants, Chinese companies are likely to 
relocate it to China, the case of Volvo being 
one example of this.
3. The rising tension in German-Chinese eco-
nomic relations may overshadow the devel-
opment of relations between Central Europe 
and China, which should be taken into ac-
count in the context of the implementation 
of the New Silk Road project19. After offering 
initially critical comments in German media 
regarding the cooperation in the ‘16+1’ for-
mat, in recent years German commentators 
19 Full text: Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative, 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/
content_281475080249035.htm
have been more cautious. However, it cannot 
be excluded that in the eventuality of a rapid 
increase in the involvement of Chinese com-
panies in Central Europe, Germany will view 
this process in a much more critical manner, 
fearing that its strategic economic interests 
in the region may be threatened in the long 
term. If acquisitions of German companies by 
Chinese investors are blocked, China may be-
come increasingly interested in buying stakes 
in companies from Central Europe which op-
erate as sub-vendors to German companies. 
This would be another attempt at gaining ac-
cess to German technologies.
4. For Central European states the introduc-
tion of the ability to block the acquisitions of 
domestic companies at an EU level may be 
a favourable solution and a mechanism that 
also protects their economies against hostile 
takeovers by investors from Russia. This in-
strument will be effective only when precise 
regulations are adopted which would not al-
low the European Commission to act fully at 
its discretion. Otherwise, owing to pressure 
from states which have considerable influ-
ence in EU institutions, the risk would emerge 
that these regulations would be applied se-
lectively for specific purposes.
